I. INTRODUCTION
An ongoing debate for the timing of adoption of new technologies has been over the relative contribution of two types of factors, broadly categorized as "technology push" and "demand pull." The former factors include both the availability of a new technology, its maturity, and its relative advantage, while the latter relate to the degree of unmet need and the awareness of the new technology. This contrast has been drawn in predictive studies for innovation adoption [2] and normative recommendations to managers [3] . For public policy research, the relative importance of these two categories has suggested efforts to support R&D and other technology development, or to encourage demand through subsidies and other incentives [4] [5] [6] .
A current example that has renewed this debate has been over policies to promote the deployment of renewable energies. While such policies are often justified in terms of economic development, the recent push has come due to increased concerns about global warming attributed to greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels [7] . The challenge is particularly daunting because "The scale of this transformation dwarfs that of most prior problems of technology policymaking. Success requires the development, commercialization, and diffusion of many 'suites' of complementary energy technologies throughout society." [8] In a special issue of Research Policy, three senior innovation scholars concluded that "strong governmental technology policy is an essential component of any portfolio of policies aiming to stop and reverse global warming" [1] . However, they argued that it is inappropriate to emulate previous technology-push approaches:
[H]alting or reversing global warming almost certainly cannot be achieved solely through 'supplyside' policies and the development of technological 'solutions'. Indeed, one of the largest dangers created by the Manhattan or Apollo metaphor is that it may be adopted by politicians seeking to avoid the far more painful demand-side policies aimed at changing human behavior. … Public policies to support the development and deployment of technological solutions to global warming are urgently needed, but these programs must differ in design from the "big push" programs exemplified by the Manhattan or Apollo projects. [1] The adoption of solar energy is an example of the broader class of technology adoption problems that may depend on both technology push and demand pull factors. As with other forms of technological adoption, policies to encourage solar adoption have addressed both the technical risks (technology push) and overcome the objections of adopters (demand pull).
Here we review the prior research on innovation as it relates to the technology push vs. demand pull debate, as well as the issues that have been previously identified for the adoption of renewable energy (RE). We answer the call of Mowery, Nelson and Martin with what we believe is the first operationalization of their policy proscriptions, by using their analysis to develop an 18-point typology of push and pull policy design principles and conditions for RE adoption. We then use this to code longitudinal data on 79 solar photovoltaic (PV) policies from 1974-2011 for three major economies: U.S., Germany, and China.
From this, we suggest that the theoretical model of technology push vs. demand pull is incomplete in explaining the adoption of renewable energy in two ways. First, we suggest extensions to the often-studied direct approaches to technology push and demand pull are policies that indirectly achieve the same goals. Secondly, we identify the role of generic complementary assets as a crucial indirect technology push factor that should be considered in renewable energy and other innovation policies.
II. THEORY-Push and Pull Factors in Promoting Innovation Adoption
The debate over the relative importance of technology push and demand pull dates back 50 years [4] 
A. Technology Push
The arguments for technology push contend that whether at the level of a specific inventor or firm [3] or at the aggregate level of an industry [17] , it is the rate of technological progress that determines the adoption and impact of new technologies. In most cases, the importance of industrial R&D is dependent on (or even subordinate to) the role of basic science in enabling this progress.
Perhaps the earliest advocate of this view was Schumpeter, who in his entrepreneurial (Mark I) and corporatist (Mark II) theories argued that radical and incremental innovation expand the base of technology which displaces existing technologies and firms. Some versions of this perspective adopt a weak form of technological determinism, assuming the direction (if not rate) of technological progress to be inevitable and perhaps even exogenous to the efforts of individual firms [12] [21] .
Some supporters of this perspective have made narrower arguments. On the one hand, the ability of a firm to deploy radical innovations may depend on a configuration of internal competencies to support a technology push approach [3] . On the other hand, the interest of buyers in using a technology may depend on the cumulative incremental improvements in cost, features or quality [4] . Still other researchers have examined the interdependencies within technology push. For example, [22] concluded that within a technology push approach, technology can pull science or that science can push technology.
B. Demand Pull
The idea that new technologies are not endogenously created, but in fact are shaped by the nature of demand can be traced to the work of Jacob Schmookler [9] [10]. As [11] put it, "Schmookler's main contention, contrary to the prevailing emphasis on changes in scientific and technological knowledge, was that demand played a leading role in determining both the direction and magnitude of inventive activity." [10] and [11] found that demand (as proxied by capital investment) led technical invention (as measured by patents).
In a review of 17 studies of innovation adoption, [17] concluded:
Market factors appear to be the primary influence on innovation. From 60 to 80 percent of important innovations in a large number of fields have been in response to market demands and needs. The remainder have originated in response to new scientific or technological advances and opportunities.
While studies of the impact of commercial or consumer demand on technological progress can inform public policy, a more direct link can be found in the role of government procurement. [5] discussed how EU governments could use public procurement to support national technology development and commercialization efforts.
In response to such studies, in their critique Mowery and Rosenberg [4] argued that the role of demand was "overextended and misrepresented." Even at that early stage in the development of renewable energy, they concluded:
The point is that in certain areas, such as alternate energy or antipollution technologies, industries may simply lack sufficient R&D resources or the necessary market-generated incentives. [4] 
C. Push and Pull Factors in Promoting Renewable Energy
Both directly for renewable energy adoption and through analogous reasoning of successful U.S. and U.K. technology policies, Mowery et al. [1] support the role of the national government in funding technology development to enable subsequent adoption. Technology push policies are also considered to be important for filling in the gaps in basic technological knowledge in the context of renewable energy [4] .
However, there has been also a recent emphasis on the use of demand-side policies. For example, an official UK blue-ribbon commission argued that strict regulatory standards to mandate RE use would "stimulate innovation by reducing uncertainty for innovators" [23] . Similarly, Hargadon [7] argued that "[d]emand-side policy incentives are considerably more effective at promoting the innovation and diffusion of renewable energy than R&D investments," a conclusion similar to that of an earlier study of other environmental technologies [24] . In his study of wind generation, Nemet [6] found that demand-side policies made California the world's leading market for wind power in the 1970s and 1980s, but encouraged incremental over radical innovation. Peters et al. [25] identified country-level spillover effects induced by demand pull policies.
Overall, studies on renewable energy adoption have suggested the need for a systemic approach by creating policies for both technology push and demand pull [1] [16] [25] . However, only a few empirical studies on RE take such a systemic approach. One was Taylor [16] who identified the importance of "interface improvement" in California solar policy as between the push and pull dichotomy Another is Peters et al. [25] who focused on aggregate level of policy determinants without determining the effect of specific policy instruments. Our aim is to contribute to this research through a crosscountry comparison of major RE markets applying a broad unit of analysis covering push and pull, and identifying a broader category of indirect push and pull policies.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
We are interested in the production and use of photovoltaic (PV) generating equipment -the direct conversion of solar energy into electricity -first made practical with the first silicon solar cell in the 1950s -which has been a major emphasis of RE policy and investment since the 1970s.1 We focus on three countries: the U.S., Germany and China, which have played a leading role in the deployment of solar energy. Based on the needs of its (government-funded) aerospace industry, United States was the technological leader and provided early niche markets from the 1960s until the 1990s. Through policy innovation, Germany has been the largest market in the world during the 21st century. Finally, with massive public investment in manufacturing companies at a time of credit contraction in the West, since 2009 China led the world in PV manufacturing capacity, as measured both by annual output and capital investment.
The present paper is based on a secondary dataset of global renewable policies since 1974 that were compiled by the International Energy Agency (IEA) from 82 countries, including 28 IEA members and 54 other countries. The database contains nearly 1,000 policies with variables such as country, jurisdiction, year of implementation, policy status, policy type, objectives and a description. From the IEA database, we first selected all RE policies from our three countries (175 in total). Then, we selected only policies that directly relate to photovoltaic solar energy; this includes both solar-specific policies as well as broader RE policies which cover solar PV among other technologies. Overall, this narrowed the 175 RE policies to 79 policies: 49 U.S., 17 German, and 13 Chinese policies.
Based on a historical analysis of U.S. and U.K. policies related to agricultural, biomedical and information technologies, Mowery, Nelson and Martin (hereafter MNM) made a series of recommendations for effective RE policies [1] . Here we offer what we believe is the first effort to operationalize the MNM design principles for use in policy assessment. To operationalize and apply these principles to the empirical data of the IEA database, we developed a coding system for qualitative content analysis using an iterative process of coding and re-coding as recommended by Eisenhardt [26] . (Table 1 The energy-related technologies that are involved in any solution to global warming are extraordinarily diverse and will be developed and produced by firms in many different industrial sectors. C 4
Global cooperation
Alternative energy technologies address a global problem but are applied locally; co-operation of national governments and even international subsidies are necessary to work on this global-local challenge.
IV. ANALYSIS A. Commonalties of Policy Choices
We summarized the prevalence of the various MNM policy principles and the associated value chain stages from the IEA data for the three countries. Each country differed in their mix of push and pull strategies:
Germany emphasized pull very early and throughout, but later added a limited number of push policies. However, the expenditures for pull policies are the largest within Germany, and the largest pull expenditures among all three countries.
While the U.S.'s initial policies included both push and pull, new policies emphasized pull until the mid1990s, and then most policies combined push and pull elements.
China's formal (IEA) policies favor pull, with technology push largely absent from later policies. However, those announced policies do not acknowledge China's sizable supply push investments in manufacturing, as discussed below.
In the average across all countries, the MNM technology push policy most commonly used is the provision for publicly performed R&D (T1a) -although not explicitly identified by MNM -and public funding of private R&D (T1b) with 28 percent and 26 percent, respectively; T1a and T1b are also the most consistent push policies across the countries. Several categories were difficult to measure from the policy database, such as the use of public funding for private R&D and the MNM ban on funding marginal improvements (T1c), while our database of public policies only identified private R&D funding (T1b) when it was a condition of receiving public funds.
On the demand side, the most common policies are financial incentives (D2) used on average 58.2% of the time -although each country used a different form: tax credits in the U.S., a feed-in-tariff for Germany and a mixture of incentives in China. Both China and the U.S. made use of regulatory performance targets (D1) (i.e. RE power quotas), and the U.S. also frequently used government procurement (D4). Overall, the U.S. had the most policies and used the broadest range of approaches over the longest period of time.
In terms of conditions, all three countries had policies that combined decentralized authority (C2a) and centralized leadership (C2b) -possibly reflecting the size of the respective national economies (#1, #2 and #4). The countries also used a mix of solar-specific and technology neutral (C3) policies. However, long-term support (C1) was the majority of policies only in Germany -which may relate to differences in the political economy, a broader societal support for RE policies, or the specifics of the U.S. (with its reliance on temporary tax credits) or China (with its relatively recent interest in RE).
What was largely or entirely missing from the policies of all three countries? Prizes (T3): only one prize competition each in the U.S. and China. Pricing externalities (D3): as was known to MNM, proposals for a "carbon tax" and other such approaches have been proposed but have proven highly controversial. Global cooperation (C4): was rare in the U.S. and China and non-existent in Germany. We believe that the IEA database accurately reflects each government's tension between economic development and fighting global warming -and thus the general lack of effective global collaboration advocated by MNM -but the data might also omit such collaboration if these policies are enacted through bilateral political negotiations.
In some cases, individual laws combined both push and pull elements, as with the U. Finally, we found two categories of policies that were not articulated in MNM typology:
Non-technological "push" policies (i.e. indirect technology push): efforts to supply finance, skilled labor or other non-tech supply push factors directly supporting manufacturing appear to be overlooked in the MNM framework.
Policies improving the interface between supply and demand (i.e. indirect demand pull): a central government promoting renewable energy would also want to reduce the likelihood that local circumstances (such as missing infrastructure, building permits or skilled installers) would discourage adoption.
Both the MNM recommendations and the policies enacted in the three countries were distributed across the solar value chain. Most (or in China, nearly all) policies emphasized deployment, i.e. the purchase and installation of solar generating equipment. On the upstream part of the value chain, applied R&D was favored over basic research or manufacturing. Each country also demonstrated increasing policy sophistication over time as the limitations of previous policies became known.
B. Policy Outcomes
The IEA database does not include policy outcomes, but from other data we could broadly assess the countrylevel success of each country's policy efforts -both in ramping up the supply of PV equipment and winning adoption of such equipment to generate electricity.
The U.S. was the early leader in developing PV technology from the 1960s to the 1980s, but adoption was relatively slow due to high prices and inconsistent policy support. In the 21st century, both public and private R&D investment focused on thin film solar technologies (where U.S. firms were deploying new patented technologies), such technologies have been losing global market share since a 2009 peak of 19%, as crystalline silicon cell prices continued their dramatic price cuts [27] [28] .
Meanwhile, Germany's innovative demand pull (feed-in-tariff) policy provided guaranteed funding by electricity customers to assure a predictable rate of return, with spending that totaled €29 billion from 2006-2012. Germany was also distinguished by consistent increases in adoption each year, as compared to other European countries (such as Spain, Czechoslovakia and Italy) that adopted temporary policies that catapulted them into the top ranks of adopters one year, and back to irrelevance later on [29] [30] [31] .
The Chinese policies were relatively late and (as according to the IEA database) limited in scope. However, through rapid expansion of manufacturing capacity from 2005-2011, China became the world's leading producer of PV equipment: in 2009, First Solar of the U.S. was the first solar manufacturer to ship one gigawatts of capacity in a single year, but by 2011 four Chinese firms had done so. China benefited from countrylevel spillovers due to demand pull policies in other countries, particularly Germany [25] . Chinese manufacturers were able to rapidly scale up through financing through government banks in the form of loans, loan guarantees and line of credit, which of course also represents a technology push measure [5] . By one estimate, global venture capital in solar totaled $1.7 billion in 2010, but Chinese government banks financed $34 billion in debt that year, including $8.9 billion to LDK Solar from the China Development Bank [32] . 2 
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The single year investment of $34 billion in 2010 compares to $31.2 billion in combined (depreciated) Such policies were not reported in the IEA database, and in fact were not openly discussed by the Chinese government.
Overall, these policies brought global installed capacity of PV equipment to 70 gigawatts at the end of 2011, with Germany accounting for 35% [30] . Fueled by German demand, the rapid growth and scale economies of Chinese manufacturers brought a rapid decline in the cost of PV equipment from 2010-2012 -leading to bankruptcy by PV producers unable to quickly scale up and reduce costs, both in the U.S. (Abound, Evergreen, Solyndra, SpectraWatt) and Germany (Q-Cells, Solon). In response, in 2011 Solar World AG -based in Germany but with U.S. manufacturing operations -filed an unfair trade complaint with the U.S. International Trade Commission, which in 2012 led to U.S. tariffs of up to 36% on Chinese imports.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper answers the call of Mowery, Nelson and Martin (2010) [1] and others in Research Policy for an improved understanding of how innovation policy can be used to redirect economic activity to combat manmade global warming. It does so by operationalizing and applying MNM's proscriptions to provide the first indepth analysis of the national solar policies in three leading markets -U.S., Germany, and China -that extend our understanding of solar industry dynamics and climate change policy more broadly. Finally, it contributes to the literature on the role of technology push and demand pull policies in promoting renewable energy -and innovation adoption more generally -while highlighting the importance of indirect push and pull policies in the adoption of systemic innovations.
